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FIRST IMPRESSIONS AND LAST RESORTS: THE PLENARY
POWER DOCTRINE, THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE, AND CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
ABSTRACT
The Convention Against Torture prohibits the exclusion or removal of any
foreign national who is likely to be tortured upon returning to his homeland,
without exception. In the United States, this absolute rule is the law of the land.
Such universal applicability exists nowhere else in American immigration law,
and for aliens convicted of serious crimes, its significance is difficult to
overstate. But those seeking relief under the Convention are unlikely to receive
it.
Many cases turn almost entirely on convincing the presiding immigration
judge to believe the applicant’s testimony—a task far easier said than done. The
decision-making process in administrative removal proceedings is often unduly
influenced by a number of problematic factors, and adverse credibility
determinations are commonly accompanied by flawed logic and flimsy
reasoning. These decisions are rarely second-guessed on appeal, and
petitioning for judicial review generally does little more than delay the
inevitable.
At the center of this troubling state of affairs is the plenary power doctrine,
the extra-constitutional foundation upon which American immigration law rests.
For the political branches, the doctrine is a wellspring of extensive and
unparalleled authority; for the courts, it is a short leash of subdued and toothless
deference. After establishing that the extraordinary degree of deference usually
required by the plenary power doctrine is unwarranted when protection is
sought under the Convention Against Torture, this Comment proposes an
alternative standard of review for cases where such relief has been denied as a
result of adverse credibility determinations.
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INTRODUCTION
As part of a comprehensive effort “to make more effective the struggle
against torture . . . throughout the world,”1 the Convention Against Torture
(CAT) prohibits the compulsory return of an individual to a homeland where he
faces a dangerous likelihood of torture.2 In accordance with the Convention’s
foundational premise that torture is never justifiable, the rule applies universally.
This principle, known as non-refoulement, is reflected domestically in the
United States through an assortment of federal statutes and regulations, and its
lack of exceptions is unique under American law.3 However, because the CAT
offers the only viable alternative to removal for foreign nationals with serious
criminal records, applications for relief under its protection inevitably invite
suspicion.4 Accompanying this unavoidable tinge of insincerity are a number of
other, less obvious factors, which together bring about a deficit of impartiality
in administrative removal proceedings.5
This tendency toward bias is particularly problematic when—as is often the
case—hard evidence is wanting and eligibility for relief turns primarily on the
presiding immigration judge’s (IJ) impression of the applicant’s trustworthiness.
However, many IJs do not believe applicants because of irrelevant or tangential
testimonial flaws,6 and in some cases, these adverse credibility determinations
are colored by reasoning that can only be described as wrong.7 Yet little recourse
exists when relief is denied. This is due, in part, to a regrettable tradition of
judicial passivity.
Unlike the rest of American law, the federal government’s authority to
control immigration derives not from the Constitution but from international
law.8 Known as the plenary power doctrine, this deeply engrained
jurisprudential fixture mandates an unmatched degree of judicial restraint.9
Consequently, removal proceedings occupy a unique legal locality, situated
between competing guarantees of sovereign autonomy and individual liberty.
The end result is a process in which judicial deference is at its peak and

1
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec.
10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
2
Id. at art. 3(1).
3
Id. at pmbl.; see infra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 199–206 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 178–218 and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 62–67, 154–58 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
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petitioners may only challenge administrative decisions on procedural grounds.
Federal courts, bound by statute and precedent, deny almost every petition for
review.10
This Comment will show that, where withholding or deferral of removal
under the CAT is involved, such an extraordinary degree of deference is
improper. While immigration law is, by nature, concerned primarily with
geopolitical boundaries, claims for relief under the CAT center on a different,
far more significant type of border—that is, the one separating safety from fear,
peace from pain, and life from death. Those seeking to avoid torture should not
be on the same footing as lottery contestants. Furthermore, unlike other aspects
of immigration law, the CAT’s protections reflect the political branches’ desire
to constrict the United States’ otherwise absolute sovereign autonomy. This selfimposed limitation should, in turn, serve to restrain the plenary power’s
influence over judicial review of denied applications for CAT-based relief.
Therefore, courts in this context should apply a deferential compromise
reflecting the Constitution’s guarantees of procedural due process while
balancing domestic statutory constraints with the United States’ international
obligations.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I addresses the CAT’s
implementation in the United States. Part II explains the plenary power doctrine,
with a focus on national sovereignty and the doctrine’s gradual limitation vis-àvis procedural due process. Part III provides an illustrative case study, and then
frames the CAT within the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. Part IV, in turn,
proposes a way in which reviewing courts can take a more active role in
preventing erroneous denials without straying outside the legal boundaries
imposed under the political branches’ plenary powers.
I.

THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE

In addition to requiring State Parties to take active steps toward preventing
torture internally, Article 3 of the CAT prohibits the expulsion, return, or
extradition of “a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”11
Reflecting this principle of non-refoulement, American immigration law allows

10
11

See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
See CAT, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
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aliens who qualify for CAT relief to avoid removal in circumstances where such
relief would otherwise be unavailable.12
This Part proceeds in three sections. Section A addresses the unique
implications of CAT relief as a “last resort” in American immigration law.
Section B highlights the hurdles that applicants face at trial, focusing on the
government’s narrow definition of “torture” and the applicant’s deceptively high
burden of proof under the “more likely than not” standard. Section C introduces
the problem of adverse credibility determinations and the judicial deference
accorded thereto on petition for review.
A. Relief of Last Resort
The CAT went into force on June 26, 1987,13 was signed by the United States
on April 18, 1988, ratified by the Senate on October 27, 1990,14 and as a nonself-executing treaty, took effect domestically eight years later when the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA) became law.15 Adopting
Article 3 as the federal government’s official policy,16 FARRA delegated the
CAT’s implementation to the Executive Branch, subject to the Senate’s
“reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos.”17 Significantly,
Congress instructed the Administration to exclude from protection aliens
“described in section 241(b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act”
(INA).18 Under the INA, certain aliens threatened with persecution in their home
countries are eligible for withholding of removal,19 but the provision cited in
FARRA lists four exceptions: (1) aliens who have persecuted others; (2) aliens
12

See infra notes 18–32 and accompanying text.
S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101–30, at 2 (1990) [hereinafter CAT RATIFICATION].
14
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988); CAT RATIFICATION, supra note 13, at 2; 136 CONG. REC. S17,429,
17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
15
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681,
2681–822 (1998) [hereinafter FARRA]; see also Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64
Fed. Reg. 8,478 (Feb. 19, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240, 241, 253, 507).
16
Compare FARRA, § 2242(a) (“It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture . . . .”), with CAT, supra note 1, at art. 3(1)
(“No State Party shall expel, return . . . or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
17
FARRA, § 2242(b)–(c); see also 28 C.F.R. § 200.1 (2013) (“A removal order under Title V of the Act
shall not be executed in circumstances that would violate Article 3 of the [CAT] . . . .”).
18
FARRA, § 2242(c) (citing the parallel codification in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2012)); accord 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (2016).
19
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (stating that the government cannot deport any alien whose “life or
freedom would be threatened in [his home] country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion”).
13
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who, “having been convicted . . . of a particularly serious crime [and are] a
danger to the community”; (3) aliens who are reasonably believed to have
“committed a serious nonpolitical crime” prior to arrival; and (4) aliens who are
reasonably believed to be “a danger to the security of the United States.”20 While
these exceptions apply in full force with respect to asylum and withholding of
removal,21 Congress made it clear that they could only apply “[t]o the maximum
extent consistent with the obligations of the United States under the [CAT].”22
Because there are no exceptions to Article 3’s non-refoulement obligations,
aliens who are ineligible for withholding of removal under the INA can still
avoid removal.23 This exception to the exception exists in the form of temporary
deferral of removal, and it is unique to the CAT.24
For some observers, deferral of removal represents a “disturbing and
dangerous loophole” that “has resulted in the presence on our Nation’s streets of
hundreds of dangerous aliens.”25 This is an oversimplification for several
reasons. As an initial point, deferral does not equate to freedom. Grantees “found
to be specially dangerous”26 are subject to the government’s discretion “to detain
[them] indefinitely and place them on restrictive supervised release.”27 And even
for those fortunate enough to be released from custody, deferral is far from ideal.
The CAT does not in any way protect against removal elsewhere.28 The
government is also free to engage in renewed de novo review against those
granted relief at any time,29 and the attorney general can—also at any time—
20

Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009) (first citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i); then citing id. §
1231(b)(3)(B)(i)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (stating that the government cannot deport any alien whose
“life or freedom would be threatened in [his home] country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
22
FARRA, § 2242(c).
23
8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(4), 1208.17(a); see also Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514 (2009) (stating that the
“‘persecutor bar’ . . . does not disqualify an alien from receiving a temporary deferral of removal under the
Convention Against Torture”).
24
Compare Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33(2), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention] (providing national security and community safety exceptions
to the rule against refoulement), with CAT, supra note 1, art. 3 (providing no exceptions to the rule).
25
Immigration Relief Under the Convention Against Torture for Serious Criminals & Human Rights
Violators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, & Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) [hereinafter Immigration Relief Hearing] (statement of Rep. John N. Hostettler,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims).
26
8 C.F.R. § 1241.14(a).
27
Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 650 F.3d 968, 978 (3d Cir. 2011) (first citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3)(D)
(2012); then citing 8 C.F.R. § 1241.14).
28
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.17(b)(2), 1208.16(f); see also Immigration Relief Hearing, supra note 25, at 4
(statement of Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims) (responding
to Rep. Hostettler’s criticism of the CAT).
29
Id. § 208.17(d)(1).
21
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terminate deferral on the basis of diplomatic assurances from the receiving
country.30 Further, although neither form of CAT relief provides a standalone
basis for adjustment to permanent resident status, withholding of removal allows
foreign nationals to pursue permanent residency through other means, while
deferral does not.31 Thus, for individuals convicted of “particularly serious
crime[s],”32 the CAT represents a last line of defense, and as objectively
unattractive as deferral may be, it certainly beats the alternative—few would
rather be tortured than detained. Those seeking to qualify for the CAT’s
protections, however, face an uphill battle.
B. Seeking CAT Relief: Issues at Trial
Rather than representing a guaranteed defense to removal for “bad actors,”33
the regulations providing for deferral of removal under the CAT are better
understood as a bare minimum codification of America’s international
obligations. To qualify, an alien must prove that “it is more likely than not that
he . . . would be tortured” if returned to his home country.34 Two obstacles loom
large in this requirement: the federal government’s narrow definition of torture
and the alien’s burden of proof.
1. A Tortured Definition of “Torture”35
Under Article 1 of the Convention, “‘torture’ means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person” to obtain information or a confession, for the sake of punishment,
intimidation, or coercion, or “for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind.”36 Importantly, Article 1 also requires that “such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”37 While American law

30

Id. § 208.17(f).
Yusupov, 650 F.3d at 978.
32
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); cf. Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[the
IJ] first concluded that Fuller’s conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault . . . was a ‘particularly serious
crime’ that barred him from withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT”).
33
Immigration Relief Hearing, supra note 25, at 2 (statement by Rep. John N. Hostettler, Chairman of
the H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims).
34
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2017). Note that aliens seeking CAT relief may only seek judicial review by
filing a petition with the appropriate circuit court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4).
35
Phrasing borrowed from Irene Scharf, Un-torturing the Definition of Torture and Employing the Rule
of Immigration Lenity, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2013).
36
CAT, supra note 1, at art. 1(1).
37
Id. This does not include suffering resulting solely from “lawful sanctions.” Id.
31
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incorporates this general definition,38 several important qualifications limit its
scope.
When ratifying the CAT, the Senate conditioned its advice and consent on
various reservations, understandings, and declarations.39 Included in the
Senate’s understandings are six important clarifications regarding Article 1,40
the most important of which defines “torture” as an act of specific intent.41 This,
in effect, has made the CAT inapplicable when severe pain or suffering is
inevitable but unintended.42 Another important understanding clarified
“acquiescence” as entailing an official’s awareness of circumstances prior to the
torturous activity,43 which has made relief inapplicable when torture results from
governmental ineptitude or impotence.44 Both of these understandings seem to
conflict with the U.N. Committee Against Torture’s understanding of the
Convention.45 The Senate’s four remaining understandings include (1) a
requirement of physical control or custody,46 (2) a clarification that legallyimposed sanctions could not permissibly extend past the Convention’s object
38

See 8 U.S.C. § 1208.18(a)(1) (repeating, nearly verbatim, CAT, supra note 1, at art. 1(1)).
CAT RATIFICATION, supra note 13, at 29–31.
40
Id. at 30.
41
See id. (“[A]n act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering . . . .” (emphasis added)).
42
See, e.g., In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 300, 303–04 (B.I.A. 2002) (13–7 decision) (holding that
imprisonment in Haiti did not amount to torture because, while the Haitian government intentionally detained
criminal deportees despite knowing of its prisons’ substandard conditions, there was no evidence that
imprisonment was specifically intended to cause severe pain and suffering).
43
CAT RATIFICATION, supra note 13, at 30.
44
See, e.g., Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836–37 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying petition for review
because “a general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to
show acquiescence” and the petitioner had failed to show that the Guatemalan “police were aware of [torturous
conduct] and breached their legal responsibility to stop it”).
45
Regarding the definition of torture, see U.N. Committee Against Torture, List of Issues to be
Considered During the Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America, ¶¶ 1–4,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/Q/2 (Feb. 8, 2006) (first citing Memorandum Opinion from Daniel L. Levin, Assistant
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Deputy Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 30, 2004)
[hereinafter 2004 Memorandum]; then citing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS:
THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 220 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter 2002
Memorandum], superseded by 2004 Memorandum, supra) (asking the United States to “explain why the
interpretation of [torture outlined in two Department of Justice] memorandums seems to be much more
restrictive than previous United Nations standards”). On the issue of governmental ineffectiveness, compare
Committee Against Torture, Communication No. 613/2014, ¶¶ 4.11, 8.8, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/56/D/613/2014
(Dec. 15, 2015) (disagreeing with the State party’s argument that removing the complainant to Guinea would
not contravene Article 3 because, although female genital mutilation is legally prohibited in Guinea and the
“situation for girls . . . [who] wish to avoid genital mutilation has improved somewhat,” the complainant would
“not have access to an effective remedy and to appropriate protection by the authorities”), with Andrade-Garcia,
828 F.3d at 836 (refusing to consider governmental ineffectiveness).
46
See CAT RATIFICATION, supra note 13, at 30.
39
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and purpose,47 (3) an elevated standard for what constitutes “mental pain or
suffering,”48 and (4) an assertion that “noncompliance with applicable legal
procedural standards does not per se constitute torture.”49
In summary, eligibility for CAT protection turns first on whether an
applicant can offer “specific objective evidence” demonstrating his or her
likelihood of experiencing
(1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2)
intentionally inflicted; (3) for a proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
who has custody or physical control of the victim; and (5) not arising
from lawful sanctions.50

Ultimately codified as federal regulations,51 these understandings present the
first obstacle for individuals seeking CAT protection.52
2. Unlikely Success Under the “More Likely Than Not” Standard
Even for applicants whose claims fit within torture’s narrow definition,
proving that its future occurrence is “more likely than not” presents an equally
(if not more) daunting task. On paper, this burden of proof—“equivalent to a
‘preponderance of the evidence’”53 standard—may not seem particularly
exacting. In practice, most applicants are unlikely to satisfy it. Of the 12,944
fully adjudicated (either approved or denied) cases in FY 2016, relief was
granted only 621 times, and only 140 of those grants were for deferral of
removal.54 This negligible success rate is typical.55 The government’s narrow
47

Id.
Id. These parameters were intended to “ensure[] that mental torture would rise to a severity seen in the
context of physical torture.” 2002 Memorandum, supra note 45, at 18.
49
CAT RATIFICATION, supra note 13, at 30.
50
Mazariegos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 280, 287 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
51
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a) (2017) (“The definitions in this subsection incorporate the definition of
torture contained in Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture, subject to the reservations, understandings,
declarations, and provisos [outlined by the Senate].”).
52
See id. § 1208.16(c) (“The definition of torture contained in § 1208.18(a) of this part shall govern all
decisions made . . . about the applicability of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.”).
53
Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 527 F.3d 330, 349 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984)); see also Raijmann v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 313 F. App’x
236, 239 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding as constitutional the [Board of Immigration Appeals] equating the “morelikely-than-not” and “preponderance of the evidence” standards in CAT removal proceedings); cf. Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328–29 (2007) (equating the two standards in another context).
54
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK M1
(2017).
55
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK,
M1 (2016) [hereinafter FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK] (10,483 fully adjudicated cases, relief granted 625
48
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definition of torture has undoubtedly influenced these statistics,56 but other
factors are at work here as well. One such factor is the simple matter of
credibility. Frequently, avoiding the dangerous consequences of removal hinges
almost entirely on the presiding IJ’s impressions.57
C. Credibility Determinations
As with asylum and withholding of removal, aliens seeking CAT protection
bear the burden of proof.58 An applicant’s testimony, if credible, can satisfy this
burden on its own, but the presiding IJ is free to demand corroborating evidence
(or an explanation for the lack thereof) when reasonable.59 This results in a
sliding scale: “the weaker an alien’s testimony, the greater the need for
corroborative evidence.”60 The standard for assessing testimonial strength,
however, is extraordinarily open-ended.
Credibility determinations are governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005.61
Before the REAL ID Act, “an IJ could base an adverse credibility determination
only on ‘issues that [went] to the heart of the applicant’s claim’ and not on
‘irrelevant inconsistencies’ or inconsistencies that could not be viewed ‘as

times, 121 grants of deferral); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2014
STATISTICS YEARBOOK M1 (2015) (11,138 fully adjudicated cases, relief granted 536 times, 121 grants of
deferral); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK M1
(2014) (10,081 fully adjudicated cases, relief granted 506 times, 131 grants of deferral); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2012 STATISTICS YEARBOOK M1 (2013) (10,353 fully adjudicated
cases, relief granted 643 times, 129 grants of deferral); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, FY 2011 STATISTICS YEARBOOK M1 (2012) (11,121 fully adjudicated cases, relief granted 629 times,
136 grants of deferral).
56
See Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection Under the
Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REV. 777, 795–806 (2009) (pointing out the flawed reasoning behind the
specific-intent requirement and emphasizing its unjust impact); Scharf, supra note 35, at 2–4, 12–15
(highlighting the adverse and inconsistent consequences of such a narrow understanding of “torture”).
57
See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the Real ID Act Is a False
Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 129 (2006) (“Credibility is arguably the most crucial aspect of any asylum
case.”); Michael Kagan, Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee Status
Determination, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 367, 368 (2003) (explaining that “being deemed credible may be the single
biggest substantive hurdle” for asylum applicants).
58
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2017), and id. § 1208.16(b), with id. § 1208.16(c)(2).
59
Soeung v. Holder, 677 F.3d 484, 487–88 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[The Board of Immigration Appeals] has
adopted a rule that ‘where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining
to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be provided . . . [or] an explanation should be given
as to why such information was not presented.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting In re S–M–J–, 21 I. &
N. Dec. 722, 725 (B.I.A. 1997))).
60
In re Y-B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1136, 1139 (B.I.A. 1998).
61
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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attempts by the applicant to enhance his claims of persecution.’”62 Today,
credibility determinations rest “on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and take
into account ‘all relevant factors.’”63 To this end, the REAL ID Act lists a
number of examples that might influence an IJ’s assessment of an applicant’s
claims. These include relatively straightforward issues, such as the level of
“consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements,”
“the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the
reports of the Department of State on country conditions),” and, of course, “any
inaccuracies or falsehoods.”64 But these elements, despite their seemingly
objective nature, can quickly become subjective because decision makers are
explicitly excused from considering “whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”65 The statute also permits
IJs to take a number of other, more obviously subjective factors into account,
such as an applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness” and the “inherent
plausibility” of his or her testimony.66 The list is definitively non-exhaustive.67
As a result, final decisions sometimes trend toward the arbitrary.68
Compounding the negative effects of such a broad standard is the fact that
courts cannot take “a fresh look at the evidence.”69 Rather, the judiciary is

62
El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Sylla v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004)); accord Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531,
537–38 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Congress’s express rejection of the prior ‘heart of the applicant’s claim’ standard
demonstrates an intent to provide more discretion to the IJ in determining credibility . . . .”); Krishnapillai v.
Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 616–17 (7th Cir. 2009) (“As the terms of the statute make clear, the IJ is no longer required
to link inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and falsehoods in a witness’s testimony to the heart of the immigrant’s
claim before relying on those defects as a reason to discredit a witness’s testimony.”); Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d
162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur previous holding that an IJ may not base an adverse credibility determination
on inconsistencies and omissions that are ‘collateral or ancillary’ to an applicant’s claims has been abrogated by
the amendments to the statutory standard imposed by the REAL ID Act.”) (citation omitted); Lin v. Mukasey,
521 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Under our case law, an adverse credibility determination may not be predicated
on inconsistencies in an applicant’s testimony that do not go to the heart of the applicant’s claim. This rule has
been superceded [sic] by the Real ID Act of 2005 . . . .”) (citation omitted); Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d
1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “to the extent Chen argues the inconsistencies and discrepancies
are ‘trivial’ and ‘irrelevant to the dispositive issues,’ he ignores the amendment” effected by the REAL ID Act).
63
El-Moussa, 569 F.3d at 256 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012)).
64
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See id. (ending the list of factors with permission to take into account “any other relevant factor”).
68
See infra notes 142–58, 187–218 and accompanying text.
69
Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2016); cf. Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006)
(“A court of appeals is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed
and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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limited to deciding petitions based entirely “on the administrative record.”70
Courts “may grant the petition only if [they] can conclude confidently that
substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination.”71 Put differently, credibility determinations can only be
overturned when “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary,”72 when “the facts compel a conclusion contrary to the one that
the IJ [or Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)] reached,”73 or when the decision
reached has been “manifestly contrary to law.”74 For a foreign national facing
the dire consequences of removal, the sole “thin comfort” available lies in the
hope that the IJ might reopen the case sua sponte.75
One reason for courts’ reluctance to second-guess administrative
immigration decisions can be credited to principles of Chevron deference.76
However, the judiciary’s deference in the immigration context is more
significantly rooted in same source of authority through which Congress passed
the REAL ID Act in the first place: the plenary power doctrine.
II. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
A long tradition of judicial self-restraint has given the federal government
the power to admit, exclude, and expel non-citizens with near impunity. This
policy of deference, commonly referred to as the “plenary power doctrine,” is
entrenched in long-standing jurisprudential principles of national sovereignty
derived from customary international law. In spite of a well-documented legacy
of discrimination and injustice,77 the doctrine remains the federal government’s

70

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).
Fuller, 833 F.3d at 871 (citing Tawuo v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2015)).
72
8 U.S.C.§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
73
Fuller, 833 F.3d at 871.
74
8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)(C).
75
Fuller, 833 F.3d at 872 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2016)); see also 8 U.S.C.§ 1252(a)(4) (noting
that “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the
sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the” CAT).
76
See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“[The Board of Immigration Appeals] should
be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process of
case-by-case adjudication.’”) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415,
425 (1999)).
77
See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858–63 (1987); Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as
Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (2010); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 13 (2003).
71
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principal source of power over immigration today.78 This Part shows how the
plenary power doctrine’s origins in international law more than two centuries
ago set the stage for the limited scope of judicial review available to petitioners
today. Section A traces the doctrine’s development and continued relevance as
a source of authority rooted in principles of state sovereignty. Section B
discusses the gradual application of procedural due process as a means of
limiting the political branches’ plenary powers in the context of removal.
A. The Plenary Power’s Sovereign Roots
Prior to 1889, a number of federalism disputes strongly indicated that the
federal government’s exclusive authority over immigration derived from the
Commerce Clause.79 But when first presented with a challenge to the
government’s exclusionary powers in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The
Chinese Exclusion Case),80 the Supreme Court shifted that source of power to
customary international legal principles of state sovereignty.81 Confronted with
a challenge to a federal statute denying entry to all Chinese citizens82—including
those who had previously obtained permission to leave and return83—the Court

78
See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015) (“This Court has consistently recognized that these
various distinctions are ‘policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and
we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress.’” (quoting Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977)). See generally David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine
Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (2015) (criticizing the claims of numerous scholars who have wrongly predicted
the doctrine’s demise).
79
See People v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 60 (1882) (invalidating a stateimposed immigration tax as “a regulation of commerce with other nations”); Henderson v. Mayor of New York,
92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875) (“‘The mind . . . can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between
nations which . . . prescribed no terms for the admission of . . . vessels[,]’ . . . their cargo or their passengers.”
(quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824)); Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 283, 400 (1849) (holding that Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause are exclusive, and
thereby invalidating state-imposed passenger taxes). Compare Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876)
(rejecting a California immigration law because it was preempted under the Commerce Clause), with Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 589–600 (1884) (affirming a federal statute nearly identical in substance to the state
law in Chy Lung was constitutional).
80
130 U.S. 581 (1889); see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation 100 YALE L.J. 545, 551 (1991).
81
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (noting that “within its own territory,” a sovereign
nation’s jurisdiction “is necessarily exclusive and absolute,” subject only to limitations imposed by its own
consent (quoting Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
82
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58–61 (repealed 1943).
83
See Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, § 2, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943) (amending the Chinese Exclusion
Act to prohibit the return of any Chinese immigrants who had previously lived in the United States). The
petitioner, Chae Chan Ping, went through considerable effort to obtain the right to re-enter, but the complete bar
on entry became law during his return voyage. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604.

JANZEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

1248

6/22/2018 10:22 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1235

unanimously decided in the government’s favor.84 Writing for the Court, Justice
Field ignored the Commerce Clause entirely and, instead, couched immigration
law in terms of foreign affairs—an area in which the United States “are one
nation.”85 Specifically, he characterized the Chinese Exclusion Act as a
legislative remedy to a perceived invasion, relying on each sovereign nation’s
inherent right of self-preservation under customary international law.86
Three years later, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,87 the Court reaffirmed
its Chinese Exclusion Case reasoning, stating
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to selfpreservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe.88

The Court then expanded the doctrine’s reach, holding that this sovereign
prescriptive power necessarily includes the power to delegate broad enforcement
powers to the executive.89
The next year, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,90 the Court expanded the
plenary power doctrine to cover removal as well as exclusion. The statute at
issue required each resident Chinese citizen to obtain a certificate from an
immigration official; failure to produce said certificate upon request resulted in
deportation.91 Writing for the majority, Justice Gray declared, “The right of a
nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any
steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds,
and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their

84

The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 611.
Id. at 604.
86
See id. at 606 (“To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and
encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to
be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign
nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. . . . If, therefore, the
government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a
different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their
exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the
foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious
and pressing.”).
87
142 U.S. 651 (1892).
88
Id. at 659.
89
Id. at 660.
90
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
91
Id. at 726.
85
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entrance into the country . . . .”92 Thus, within just a few years, the Court
untethered immigration law from the Constitution’s protective boundaries and
bestowed upon the political branches a plenary power conterminous with state
sovereignty. The result has been a legacy of unparalleled judicial deference.93
To borrow from Justice Frankfurter: “[W]hether immigration laws have been
crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general or antiSemitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress.”94
Congress, however, frequently delegates this responsibility to the Executive,
and, in doing so, confers the same level of protection from judicial scrutiny.95 It

92
Id. at 707; see also id. at 713 (“The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one
foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and
the same power.”). It is also worth noting that, throughout these three landmark cases, the Court cited a
significant amount of classical scholarship in support of sovereign power, but the accuracy of that assessment is
questionable. Compare EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 226–27 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore
eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758) (“[I]t belongs to the nation to judge, whether her circumstances will or will not
justify the admission of that foreigner. . . . But this prudence should be free from unnecessary suspicion and
jealousy;—it should not be carried so far as to refuse a retreat to the unfortunate, for slight reasons, and on
groundless and frivolous fears.” (emphasis added)), with Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707–08 (quoting the same
passages, but omitting Vattel’s exclusion of a nation’s right to “refuse a retreat to the unfortunate, for slight
reasons, and on groundless and frivolous fears”). See generally James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of
Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 804, 825–27 (1983) (arguing that the Court’s interpretation
of classical scholarship was inaccurate).
93
See, e.g., Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017) (“An American
individual or entity that has a bona fide relationship with a particular person seeking to enter the country as a
refugee can legitimately claim concrete hardship if that person is excluded. . . . But when it comes to refugees
who lack any such connection to the United States, . . . the balance tips in favor of the Government’s compelling
need to provide for the Nation’s security.”); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (“The
dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that [immigration]
enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.”);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 (1952) (“It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward
aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations . . . .”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding as constitutional the
Attorney General’s decision to exclude petitioner on the grounds that her admission would be prejudicial to the
country’s interests); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (“As a member of
the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in [international affairs is] equal to the right and
power of the other members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign.
The power to . . . expel undesirable aliens . . . exist[s] as inherently inseparable from the conception of
nationality.”); cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114 (1976) (holding the Civil Service Commission’s
denial of employment to non-citizens unconstitutional because the Commission “has no responsibility for
foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for
naturalization policies”).
94
Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
95
See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 834 (2016) (“Congress has ‘plenary power to make rules
for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has
forbidden.’ When Congress delegates this plenary power to the Executive, the Executive’s decisions are likewise
generally shielded from administrative or judicial review.” (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)).
But cf. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20 (“[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President
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is in this setting that reviewing courts must address administrative immigration
decisions, including claims for CAT relief.96 While Congress’s ability to
legislate substantive immigration law remains largely unqualified, the
Constitution’s territorial application has gradually compelled the Court to
recognize protections for resident aliens facing removal under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.97
B. “Civil” Removal and the Slow Growth of Procedural Rights
Since it was first raised as an issue in Fong Yue Ting, removal has been
considered a civil—not a criminal—matter.98 Habeas corpus rights
notwithstanding, those facing removal during the first few decades following the
plenary power’s inception could expect nothing more than illusory due
process.99 Even when the Court did eventually acknowledge the need for
procedural protections in Yamataya v. Fisher,100 Justice Harlan qualified the
holding to render it essentially meaningless,101 allowing the government to

as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations . . . must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.”).
96
See, e.g., Andrade-Garcia, 828 F.3d at 834 (discussing the plenary power doctrine in the context of a
CAT applicant’s petition for review); cf. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“[J]udicial deference in
the immigration context is of special importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’”) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Abudu,
485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
97
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) (arguing that, because the
plenary power doctrine precludes substantive judicial review of immigration law, courts have used procedural
surrogates to indirectly influence the substantial rights of aliens).
98
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893) (“[H]ere are all the elements of a civil
case.”); id. at 730 (“The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the
sense . . . of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not
complied with the conditions upon . . . which the government . . . has determined that his continuing to reside
here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
and the provisions of the Constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”).
99
See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (holding that, while an alien who
has been denied entry “is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus,” any executive or administrative decisions
made within the confines of congressionally delegated power “are due process of law”).
100
189 U.S. 86, 102 (1903) (holding that no executive officer could “arbitrarily . . . cause an alien . . . to
be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard”).
101
See id. at 101 (clarifying that due process in the context of removal is “not necessarily an opportunity
upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the prompt,
vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon
which such officers are required to act”); see also Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912) (“In
order to successfully attack by judicial proceedings the conclusions and orders made upon such hearings it must
be shown that the proceedings were manifestly unfair, that the action of the executive officers was such as to
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prevail in a case that was unfair by any legitimate standard.102 The decision to
ignore due process in immigration proceedings was not universally popular,
however, and the dissenters in Fong Yue Ting—Justice Brewer,103 Justice Field
(the same Justice Field who penned The Chinese Exclusion Case opinion),104
and Chief Justice Fuller105—ultimately influenced later trends toward greater
procedural due process guarantees for resident aliens charged with removability.
Justice Brewer, whose dissent best represents the trio as a whole,
diametrically opposed the majority’s characterization of removal, proclaiming,
“Deportation is punishment . . . [and] punishment implies a trial.”106
Furthermore, he argued, those who have developed strong communal ties to the
United States (e.g., lawful permanent residents) should accordingly be allotted
greater constitutional protections than those who lack communal ties (e.g.,
temporary workers or tourists).107 Justice Brewer reserved his strongest rhetoric,
although, for the majority’s reliance on principles of national sovereignty. The
passage is worth quoting at length:
It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty. This
doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and
dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by
whom are they to be pronounced? Is it within legislative capacity to
declare the limits? If so, then the mere assertion of an inherent power
creates it, and despotism exists. May the courts establish the
boundaries? Whence do they obtain the authority for this? Shall they
look to the practices of other nations to ascertain the limits? The
governments of other nations have elastic powers—ours [are] fixed
prevent a fair investigation or that there was a manifest abuse of the discretion committed to them by the statute.
In other cases the order of the executive officers within the authority of the statute is final.”).
102
The proceedings were premised on a “pretended” investigation, during which the alien “did
not . . . know that the investigation had reference to her being deported from the country.” She did not speak
English, nor did she understand the “nature and import” of the questions she was asked. Id. at 101–02.
103
149 U.S. at 732–44 (Brewer, J. dissenting).
104
Id. at 744–61 (Field, J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 761–63 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
106
Id. at 741 (Brewer, J. dissenting); see also id. at 754–55 (Field, J., dissenting) (setting aside due process
“would be to establish a pure, simple, undisguised despotism and tyranny”); id. at 763 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)
(“No euphuism can disguise the character of the act . . . . It is, in effect, a legislative sentence of banishment,
and, as such, absolutely void.”).
107
See id. at 734 (Brewer, J. dissenting) (“[T]hose who have become domiciled in a country are entitled
to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than those who are simply passing through, or temporarily
in, it . . . .”); cf. id. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting) (“[B]etween legislation for the exclusion of Chinese
persons . . . and legislation for the deportation of those who have acquired a residence in the country under a
treaty with China, there is a wide and essential difference.”); id. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (“Conceding
that . . . the denial of entrance is not necessarily the subject of judicial cognizance, the exercise of the power to
expel . . . rest[s] on different ground, since limitations exist or are imposed upon the deprivation of that which
has been lawfully acquired.”).
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and bounded by a written constitution. The expulsion of a race may be
within the inherent powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption
of this Constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of
such a power, and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely,
and it seems to me, they gave to this government no general power to
banish.108

The Court has consistently tipped its hat to Justice Brewer’s claim that
“deportation is punishment,”109 yet it continues to classify removal as a civil,
non-punitive revocation of a discretionary privilege rather than as a criminal,
punitive revocation of an established right.110 Read superficially, this
classification seems to give the political branches an unqualified discretion to
completely bar judicial review of removal orders. Nonetheless, the nearly
complete lack of due process upheld as constitutional in Fong Yue Ting would
almost certainly be impermissible today.
For example, in Bridges v. Wixon,111 the Court held that the admission of
hearsay evidence in removal proceedings was an unconstitutional “practice
which runs counter to the notions of fairness on which our legal system is
founded.”112 In its reasoning, the majority unequivocally recognized that “the
liberty of an individual is at stake” in removal proceedings and that
“[m]eticulous care must [therefore] be exercised lest the procedure by which
[the individual] is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of

108
Id. at 737–38 (1893) (Brewer, J. dissenting); cf. id. at 757–58 (Field, J., dissenting) (“There is a great
deal of confusion in the use of the word ‘sovereignty’ by law writers. Sovereignty or supreme power is in this
country vested in the people, and only in the people.”); id. at 763 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (“[The Act] contains
within it the germs of the assertion of an unlimited and arbitrary power, in general, incompatible with the
immutable principles of justice, inconsistent with the nature of our government, and in conflict with the written
Constitution by which that government was created, and those principles secured.”).
109
Id. at 740 (Brewer, J. dissenting); see, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm’n, 525
U.S. 471, 497 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“Deportation, in any event, is a grave sanction.”); Fong Haw
Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[D]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile.”); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (“Deportation can be the equivalent
of banishment or exile.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (“[A]lthough deportation technically is
not criminal punishment, it may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to pursue a
vocation or a calling.”) (citations omitted); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (removal may result
in “loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living”).
110
See Zadvyas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“The proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal,
and we assume that they are nonpunitive in purpose and effect.”). For more on the rights–privileges distinction,
see Motomura, supra note 97, at 1650–51.
111
326 U.S. 135 (1945).
112
Id. at 154; cf. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 742–43 (Brewer, J. dissenting) (pointing out that Congress
had failed to identify which judges could adjudicate removal matters and had left out a mechanism for producing
witnesses, thus giving officials full discretion to employ state and local courts based on expedience while
suppressing access to an essential element of each alien’s case).

JANZEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2

2018]

FIRST IMPRESSIONS AND LAST RESORTS

6/22/2018 10:22 AM

1253

fairness.”113 But despite the broad constitutional language in Bridges, the Court
explicitly limited the scope of its holding to the statute at hand.114 It was not until
four decades later, in Landon v. Plasencia,115 that the Justices took the first
meaningful step toward ensuring procedural due process in the immigration
context.116
In the process of expanding due process protections for lawful permanent
residents in exclusion proceedings, the Court in Plasencia fully adopted Justice
Brewer’s argument in Fong Yue Ting that a resident alien’s constitutional rights
are positively correlated with his ties to the United States.117 Additionally, the
majority reaffirmed the premise that while only lawful permanent residents can
benefit from due process protections in an exclusionary setting, “continuously
present resident alien[s] [are] entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with
deportation.”118 Importantly, the Court qualified that premise by acknowledging
that “[t]he constitutional sufficiency of procedures provided in any situation, of
course, varies with the circumstances.”119
To accommodate these circumstantial variations, the Court incorporated the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test for determining whether procedural due
process has been satisfied.120 This requirement of a “fundamentally fair removal
hearing”—now a cornerstone of American immigration jurisprudence121—has
led courts to invalidate a number of administrative actions in the name of due
process.122 The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test provides the framework in
113

Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154.
Id. at 156–57; see also Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336, 345–46 (1925) (employing a liberal
construction of the Immigration Act of 1924 with the aim of “preserv[ing] treaty rights unless clearly annulled,”
consequently placing the wives and minor children of Chinese merchants inside one of the Act’s exceptions).
Although beyond this Comment’s scope, this method of lenient statutory interpretation is alive and well. See,
e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012) (holding that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act did not have ex post facto effect on lawful permanent resident petitioner’s ability to travel
outside the United States because Congress had not expressly stated an intent to apply the statute retroactively).
115
459 U.S. 21 (1982).
116
Motomura, supra note 97, at 1652–53.
117
Compare Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32 (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”), with Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 734 (1893) (Brewer, J. dissenting) (“[T]hose who have become
domiciled in a country are entitled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than those who are simply
passing through . . . .”).
118
Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32.
119
Id. at 34.
120
Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)). For a recitation of the Mathews v.
Eldridge balancing test, see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
121
Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 2010).
122
See, e.g., id. at 181 (holding that an IJ’s failure to inform petitioner of the availability of free legal
services, in violation of immigration regulations, violated due process); Malave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 488
114
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which courts can assess the proper degree of deference applicable to reviews of
adverse credibility determinations for CAT applicants.
III. BALANCING DEFERENCE AND DUE PROCESS
The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test injects a clear due process exception
into the plenary power doctrine. Although the doctrine continues to preclude
substantive judicial review of immigration statutes, the sovereign’s inherent
right to expel is no longer “absolute and unqualified” within the Constitution’s
jurisdictional purview.123 Rather, the federal government may only exercise its
powers over immigration within the boundaries prescribed by the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”124 These boundaries extend to CAT
proceedings.125
But no universal standard exists for determining when due process has been
achieved. The degree to which the Fifth Amendment’s protections apply
depends on how courts weigh “the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as
the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the
interest of the government in using the current procedures rather than additional
or different procedures.”126 Sections B, C, and D of this Part frame applications
for relief under the CAT within each aspect of the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test. The following case study facilitates that analysis.
A. Fuller v. Lynch: Judicial Inaction in Action
LGBT persons have endured a well-documented history of “severe abuse
and discrimination” in Jamaica.127 These human-rights abuses “includ[e] assault
(7th Cir. 2010) (holding that prior to executing an unreviewable denial of adjustment of status based on adverse
testimony, due process required “the IJ, as the Attorney General’s delegate, [to] furnish the alien with
compulsory process to seek the adverse witness’s presence”); Lewis v. Chertoff, 194 F. App’x 1, 2 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that the Board of Immigration Appeals summary dismissal of alien’s petition for review based
on alien’s failure to file a brief violated due process).
123
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
124
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also supra notes 111–22 and accompanying text (describing the gradual
adoption of procedural due process in removal proceedings).
125
See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“The CAT and its
implementing regulations are binding domestic law. . . . [Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act] and its
regulations generate interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due Process Clause . . . .” (first citing U.S.
CONST. amend. V; then citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976))).
126
Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35).
127
Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2016).
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with deadly weapons, ‘corrective rape’ of women accused of being lesbians,
arbitrary detention, mob attacks, stabbings, . . . and targeted shootings.”128 The
authorities’ de facto policy of willful blindness and their proclivity for to “arrest,
detain, and torture LGBT persons”129—endorsed by a deeply engrained pop
culture steeped in homophobic antagonism130—offers little hope for victims and
deters many from filing police reports.131 Furthermore, Jamaica’s government
has directly endorsed the oppression of sexual minorities by legally prohibiting
homosexual activity.132
It was in this setting that Ray Fuller discovered his bisexual identity as a
preteen growing up in Kingston.133 At various points in his life, he was attacked
with stones, cut with a knife, and shot—all on account of his sexual
orientation.134 Shortly after he was shot, his family condemned his sexuality and
disowned him.135 Fuller legally entered the United States in 1999 following his
engagement to a woman who was a U.S. citizen, but his lawful status expired
when the couple failed to attend an immigration interview in 2004.136 That same
year, Fuller pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sexual assault and was
sentenced to thirty months of probation.137 Eight years later, he was resentenced

128
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, JAMAICA 2013 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT 21 (2013) [hereinafter JAMAICA 2013 REPORT]; see Fuller, 833 F.3d at 872 (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n 2006 Time Magazine claimed that Jamaica was the worst place in the Americas for LGBT
people and one of the most homophobic places in the world.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, JAMAICA 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
20–22 (2012) (citing human rights abuses substantially identical to the 2013 Report).
129
Fuller, 833 F.3d at 868; see JAMAICA 2013 REPORT, supra note 128, at 21–22 (noting that the Jamaican
“police force in general . . . failed to investigate such incidents”).
130
See Fuller, 833 F.3d at 872 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“Certain Jamaican music, which features hostility
to homosexuals, such as in a T.O.K. song ‘Chi Chi Man’ which threatens to burn fire on gays and those in their
company, employs the term ‘batty boy’ to disparage LGBT people. One notorious song, ‘Boom Bye Bye’ written
by dancehall musician Buju Banton, advocates violence against batty boys, including shooting them in the head
and setting them on fire . . . .”).
131
Id. (noting that “most Jamaican homosexuals are not going to go public with their homosexuality given
the vicious[ness] [of] Jamaican discrimination”); see also AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
2016/17: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 209 (2017) (“[O]nly 36% of Jamaicans surveyed said
they would allow their gay child to continue to live at home. Almost 60% of respondents said they would harm
an LGBTI person who approached them. In June [2016], the Attorney General used social media to criticize the
US Embassy for flying a Pride flag after the killings of LGBTI people in a nightclub in Orlando, USA.”).
132
JAMAICA 2013 REPORT, supra note 128, at 21; AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 131, at 209; cf. Bromfield
v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Jamaican government not only acquiesces in the torture
of gay men, but is directly involved in such torture.”).
133
Fuller, 833 F.3d at 868.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 867–68. Fuller and his wife divorced in 2005. Id. at 868.
137
Id. at 868.
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to serve four years in prison for violating the terms of his parole.138 Upon his
release from prison in 2014, Fuller was detained yet again—this time by the
Department of Homeland Security—and placed in removal proceedings.139 The
IJ sustained his removability, and the BIA affirmed.140 Instead of challenging
his removability directly, Fuller sought relief under the INA and the CAT, citing
both his own personal experience and other documented evidence of Jamaica’s
human-rights abuses as grounds for either withholding or deferral of removal.141
The IJ rejected Fuller’s arguments and denied all relief.142 First, she
concluded that Fuller was ineligible for withholding of removal because his
criminal conviction constituted a “particularly serious crime.”143 Then, the IJ
determined Fuller was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT because
she believed neither Fuller’s “basic assertion that he is bisexual” nor “that the
Jamaican government would regard him as such.”144 The IJ’s determination that
Fuller was not bisexual, seconded by the BIA, was the core issue on review in
the Seventh Circuit.145
The IJ’s conclusion regarding Fuller’s sexual orientation resulted, in part,
from her failure to grasp the most basic definition of bisexuality. As evidence of
Fuller’s heterosexuality, she cited “the fact that Fuller had been married to a
woman, fathered children with two different women, and was convicted for
sexual assault on a woman.”146 Of course, “[n]one of those actions is necessarily
inconsistent with a bisexual orientation; after all, the very word ‘bisexual’
indicates that the person is attracted to both women and men.”147 Had that been

138

Id.
Id.
140
Id. Fuller was charged as removable for “being convicted of an aggravated felony,” “for being
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,” and “for losing his conditional permanent resident status.” Id.
(citations omitted). The IJ sustained all three grounds for removability, but the BIA only addressed Fuller’s loss
of conditional permanent resident status, declining to comment on the two remaining issues. Id.
141
Id. at 867–68; cf. 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012) (stating the general rule restricting removal of aliens
facing persecution and applicable exceptions to that rule); Withholding of Removal Under Section 241(b)(3)(B)
of the Act and Withholding of Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2002)
(stating the procedural guidelines and applicability for withholding of removal under the CAT); Deferral of
Removal Under the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17 (2008) (stating the procedural guidelines
and applicability for grants of deferral of removal under the CAT).
142
Fuller, 833 F.3d at 869.
143
Id. (first citing 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); then citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2)) (internal quotations
omitted).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 871.
146
Id. at 869.
147
Id.
139
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the sole basis for the IJ’s decision, the Seventh Circuit “would have granted
[Fuller’s] petition,” but the IJ also disbelieved Fuller on other grounds.148
Fuller contradicted his own account of getting shot, and his claim to have
only been shot once conflicted with a letter offered in support of his claims.149
He also failed to consistently recall details concerning members of his family,150
and he had lied on an immigration application to visit Jamaica fifteen years
before.151 The IJ also set aside all seven of the letters sent by Fuller’s children,
friends, and former boyfriends in support of his claims.152 None of the authors
was available to testify, several letters were “stylistically suspicious” due to their
uniform inclusion of “a signature line made on a series of dots,” and Fuller’s
claim to have called each signatory while detained did not line up with the jail’s
telephone records.153
These discrepancies were “unquestionable, but trivial and indeed irrelevant”
to the actual issue at hand—that is, Ray Fuller’s sexual orientation.154 The timing
and quantity of his bullet wounds had no bearing on his sexuality.155 Neither did
his failure to effectively recall estranged relatives’ names, nor did his inability
to produce witnesses.156 The fact that Fuller submitted letters sharing the same
signature line is remarkably tangential.157 But irrelevance, here, was irrelevant.
Petition denied.158
148

Id. at 871.
See id. at 869–70 (“In his written statement, . . . Fuller said that he was shot during his college years,
from 1983 to 1988, at a party hosted by his college boyfriend Henry; he testified, in marked contrast, that the
shooting happened nearly a decade later at the house of a boyfriend named Steven in 1997, shortly before his
sister kicked him out of her house. . . . [In a supporting letter,] the author wrote that Fuller had been shot on
multiple occasions, contrary to his testimony that he was shot only once.”).
150
See id. at 869 (“Fuller confused his sisters’ names, mixed up a sister with his mother, and gave different
figures for the number of sisters that he had.”).
151
See id. (“[H]e wrote that he wanted to visit his sick mother in Jamaica, even though his mother at the
time was actually living in the United States.”).
152
Id. at 870.
153
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154
Id. at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“What this has to do with his sexual proclivities eludes me.”).
155
See id. (“[W]hat could the change [in dates] have to do with whether he is bisexual?”); id. (arguing that
“[t]he number of times he’d been shot could not be thought to have undermined his evidence that he is bisexual,”
especially when Fuller had “minimized that number” despite having an incentive to exaggerate).
156
Id. (“[T]here is no showing that the ex-boyfriends’ unavailability to testify was attributable to Fuller’s
fearing they wouldn’t help his case.”).
157
See id. (“There is no explanation of why this should be considered suspicious, since while a signature
line is often an unbroken straight line it is sometimes composed of dots or dashes instead.”). It is also worth
noting that, despite implying that Fuller had drafted these testimonials himself, the IJ also discredited Fuller in
part because of discrepancies between his testimony and a support letter. Cf. supra note 149. Under this logic,
Ray Fuller had actively worked to sabotage his own case. It seems the letters were credible only insofar as they
worked to his disadvantage.
158
Id. at 872 (majority opinion).
149
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B. The Private Interests at Stake for Individuals
The magnitude of a genuine CAT relief applicant’s interests is profound.
Even in the absence of possible persecution and torture, the Court has described
removal as a “grave sanction,”159 as “the equivalent of banishment or exile,”160
and as an event that may result in the loss “of all that makes life worth living.”161
These notions are amplified from the perspective of applicants in CAT cases, for
whom erroneous denials necessarily entail “ghastly consequences.”162
To supplement the potentially grim forecast for Ray Fuller, consider Biuma
Malu, who was sold for a “bride-price” at age eleven to “her uncle, a highranking officer in the Congolese military, [who] raped her, impregnated her, put
her head in the toilet, urinated on her, burned her with cigarettes, stabbed her,
and pierced her with a screwdriver.”163 Before age twelve, she had aborted three
pregnancies and had just become pregnant again when “rebel soldiers invaded
[her] home, killed two of her brothers and two of her sisters, beat her father, and
raped [her] and her mother,” causing a miscarriage.164 Despite acknowledging
the implications of these claims, the IJ remained unconvinced of their
truthfulness; Malu, appearing pro se, had failed to provide “a reasonably
obtainable medical evaluation of her scars, evidence establishing the identity of
her uncle, and evidence substantiating her family’s horrific encounter with the
rebel soldiers.”165 Again, the same result: petition denied.166
To grasp the tremendous interests at stake for genuine CAT applicants, one
need only consider a hypothetical in which Ray Fuller’s and Biuma Malu’s
allegations were, in fact, true. This analysis therefore assumes that the private
interest at stake for CAT applicants is greater than in any other civil or
administrative context.167

159

Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm’n, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
161
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
162
Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2016); cf. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (“Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete
with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return
to his or her home country.”).
163
Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1286.
166
Id. at 1293.
167
Notable exceptions to this premise include claims for asylum and withholding of removal, where the
stakes are arguably just as high. The exclusive focus on CAT claims here is intended, not to discount the gravity
of asylum and withholding of removal proceedings, but simply to stay within this Comment’s limited scope and
to avoid confusing the issues.
160
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C. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation
To address the risk of an erroneous deprivation under current procedural
protections requires, first, a brief description of what those protections are.
Facially, the current procedural framework for removal satisfies the basic
requirements of due process. An alien in removal proceedings is entitled to the
following: (1) legal representation (albeit “at no expense to the Government”),168
(2) “a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence [offered against him],”169
(3) “a reasonable opportunity . . . to present evidence on [his] own behalf,”170
(4) “a reasonable opportunity . . . to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government,”171 (5) maintenance of “a complete record . . . of all testimony and
evidence produced at the proceeding,”172 (6) the right to appeal the IJ’s decision
to the BIA and to be notified of that right,173 and (7) the right to appeal the BIA’s
decision by filing a petition for review in the applicable circuit court.174 These
assurances seem a far cry from the kangaroo court that won the day in
Yamataya.175
However, in an effort to reduce an increasingly backlogged caseload,
regulations intended to streamline the BIA’s review process stripped the BIA of
its ability to engage in de novo review of an IJ’s factual findings, including
credibility determinations.176 Similarly, circuit courts are confined to addressing
“constitutional claims or questions of law” when considering petitions for
review.177 Therefore, the risk of an erroneous deprivation resulting from an
adverse credibility determination exists almost entirely within the context of
initial removal proceedings before an IJ. The following analysis highlights the
numerous problems that can adversely affect an IJ’s chances of accurately
assessing an applicant’s credibility.

168

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012).
Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. § 1229a(b)(4)(C).
173
Id. § 1229a(c)(5).
174
Id. § 1252(a)(4).
175
Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 102 (1903).
176
Board of Immigration Appeals; Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg.
54,878, 54,902 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3); Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of
Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135–42 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
177
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
169
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1. Impact of Trauma on Memory
A key component of many CAT proceedings is whether the applicant has
suffered past torture.178 Yet torture victims are not always capable of
consistently testifying about their experiences.
Torture is not torture without trauma, and victims often suffer from
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).179 A general symptom of PTSD is the
“[i]nability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event(s).”180 This
does not apply exclusively to persons who have suffered specific and acute acts
of torture. Those who have suffered from “a history of cumulative trauma” are
also likely to suffer from “complex PTSD,”181 which entails, among other things,
symptoms of “amnesia and denial of the impact and severity of traumatic
events.”182 These symptoms are often unlikely to subside naturally for displaced
victims, most of whose post-migration lives are accompanied by the fearful
undertones of possible repatriation.183 Further, LGBT migrants fleeing
persecution—often rejected by their ethnic communities, yet unable to relate to
the vastly different experiences of American LGBT individuals—face a strong
likelihood of accumulated trauma.184 Removal proceedings serve only to
exacerbate that stress.185 Taking these factors into account, Ray Fuller’s
conflicting testimony concerning the shooting incident is arguably less
suspicious.186 In any case, credibility determinations involving the consistency
of CAT applicants’ experiences should receive more than a cursory review and
a quick nod of approval.
178
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (“In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would
be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be
considered, including, but not limited to: (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant[] . . . .”).
179
Katrin Schock et al., Impact of Asylum Interviews on the Mental Health of Traumatized Asylum Seekers,
EUR. J. PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY 2015, at 1–2; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 274 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM V] (citing torture as one cause of PTSD).
180
DSM V, supra note 179, at 271.
181
Ariel Shidlo & Joanne Ahola, Mental Health Challenges of LGBT Forced Migrants, 42 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 9, 9 (2013). Events causing PTSD “include combat experiences, natural catastrophes, assault,
rape, and serious accidents.” Andrea E. Bopp Stark, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Refugee Women: How to
Address PTSD in Women Who Apply for Political Asylum Under Grounds of Gender-Specific Persecution, 11
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 179 (1996) (citation omitted).
182
Shidlo & Adhola, supra note 181.
183
Schock et al., supra note 179, at 2.
184
Rebecca Hopkinson et al., Persecution Experiences and Mental Health of LGBT Asylum Seekers, 64 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 1650, 1652.
185
Cf. Schock et al., supra note 179, at 2 (“Previous studies have shown that most asylum seekers
experience the immigration process—including the asylum interview—as being stressful and provoking
anxiety.”).
186
See Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2016) (highlighting the inconsistencies in Fuller’s
testimony).
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2. Sexual Identity and Self-Presentation
In cases like Fuller where relief turns on the issue of sexual orientation,
PTSD’s problematic effects can be compounded by an applicant’s internal
conflict regarding self-presentation. LGBT individuals who grow up in cultures
inimical to sexual minorities often, as a matter of survival, alter their behavior
to assimilate within their culture’s expected gender roles.187 To compensate for
this act of “passing,”188 some applicants may feel compelled to engage in
“‘reverse covering’—manipulating their external presentation to fit the
evaluator’s stereotypes.”189 This fear, for lack of a better phrase, of appearing
“too straight,” is not unfounded; the BIA once affirmed an IJ’s denial of asylum
where the IJ found the applicant credible but reasoned protection was
unwarranted, stating, “I certainly would not be able to tell, just from [the
petitioner’s] testimony and his appearance here in Court today that he was
homosexual.”190 Even more disconcerting are cases like Fuller, where the IJ is
fundamentally unequipped to make such a determination in the first place.191
3. Implicit Bias
Implicit bias poses another threat to judicial impartiality in CAT
proceedings. Implicit bias “involve[s] negative attitudes and stereotypes that are
based on ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, religion, political affiliation, and
numerous other categories,” and it affects how a large portion of society makes
decisions.192 Justice, at its most basic level, should compel adjudicators to strive
“to get into an attitude of deciding other people’s controversies, instead of
waging them,”193 but IJs remain vulnerable to unconscious influence.194
187
Shana Tabak & Rachel Levitan, LGBTI Migrants in Immigration Detention: A Global Perspective, 37
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 17 (2014) (citations omitted).
188
“Passing” occurs when gay people steer clear of gender nonconformity to “hid[e] their identity.” Id. at
18 (citing Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002)).
189
Id. at 22 (citing Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 909 (2002)).
190
Opening Brief for Petitioner at 41, Vega v. Gonzales, 183 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir., June 2, 2006) (No.
04-70868), 2004 WL 5466690, at *41; see also Eke v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 381 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying
petition for review when the IJ made an adverse credibility determination and “the applicant failed to either
submit some kind of documentation indicating his sexual preferences . . . [and] could not provide the name of
the gentleman with whom he was allegedly involved in a homosexual relationship”).
191
See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text (describing the IJ’s misunderstanding of bisexuality).
192
Anna Roberts, Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction
Impeachment and the Fight Against Implicit Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 862 (2016).
193
Justice Jackson’s Story, Manuscript of Tape Recordings taken by Dr. Harlan B. Phillips, Oral History
Research Office, Columbia University, 1952–1953, at 1097 (on file with the Library of Congress, Justice
Jackson’s Papers, Box 191).
194
See Judge Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, 54 JUDGES’ J., Fall 2015, at 20,
21 (detailing examples of where the author, an IJ, has caught herself assessing credibility determinations based
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Credibility determinations in immigration courts are much more likely to be
colored by implicit bias for four primary reasons: vague and discretionary
judgment standards,195 constant pressure to make quick decisions as a result of
heavy case backlog,196 negatively impacted emotional states,197 and cultural
differences.198 In addition to the effects that these factors have on the removal
process as a whole, proceedings concerning deferral of removal under the CAT
entail other specific—and potentially more dangerous—threats to judicial
impartiality.
While deferral of removal under the CAT applies to various categories of
aliens who are otherwise ineligible for relief,199 applicants with domestic
on implicit bias); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225 (2009) (“[I]mplicit biases are widespread among judges.”).
195
See PAMELA M. CASEY, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF
IMPLICIT BIAS 2 (2012) (“When the basis for judgment is somewhat vague (e.g., situations that call for
discretion . . . ), biased judgments are more likely.”); supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text (describing the
standard for credibility determinations).
196
See CASEY, supra note 195, at 4 (“[S]tressful (e.g., heavy, backlogged, or very diverse
caseloads . . . ) . . . circumstances can adversely affect judicial performance.”) (citations omitted); see also Exec.
Office for Immigration Review Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border
Sec., & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 53 (2010) (statement of Hon. Dana Leigh
Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges) (“Despite the stakes of these proceedings, we operate with
scarce resources at a pace that would make a traffic court judge’s head spin.”); Eli Saslow, In a Crowded
Immigration Court, Seven Minutes to Decide a Family’s Future, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-a-crowded-immigration-court-seven-minutes-to-decide-afamilys-future/2014/02/02/518c3e3e-8798-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html?utm_term=.26d2c446daec
(describing the experience of an immigration court where the IJ “had an average of seven minutes per case”).
197
See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National
Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 59 (2008) (explaining
that secondary traumatic stress “includes symptoms similar to the PTSD symptoms that afflict trauma victims
themselves” and that “IJs indicated that they experienced significant symptoms of secondary traumatic stress”);
CASEY, supra note 195, at 2 (“Certain emotional states (anger, disgust) can exacerbate implicit bias in judgments
of stigmatized group members, even if the source of the negative emotion has nothing to do with the current
situation or with the issue of social groups or stereotypes more broadly.” (citations omitted)).
198
See Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation of Asylum
Applicants, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1991) (“Failure to maintain eye-contact may be considered
by people in Western cultures as manifestations of deception. . . . However, the social significance of eyecontact, as well as expressions of emotions, vary from culture to culture . . . .”); see also Kadia v. Gonzales, 501
F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[I]mmigration judges often lack the ‘cultural competence’ to base credibility
determinations on an immigrant’s demeanor.”); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 276 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(McKee, J., dissenting in part) (“[W]hile the failure to look someone in the eye while speaking is usually
interpreted as an indication of deception by people in Western cultures, avoiding eye contact has a very different
meaning in some other cultures.”); Chouchkov v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 220 F.3d 1077, 1083 n.15
(9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]hat sounds peculiar in one country may be the norm in another.”); Barapind v. Rogers, No.
96–55541, 1997 WL 267881, at *2 (9th Cir., May 15, 1997) (holding that an inference of petitioner’s dishonesty
based on his “‘stoic’ demeanor . . . appear[ed] to reflect cultural bias on the part of the IJ”).
199
See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text (identifying the four categories of aliens ineligible for
all forms of relief outside of the CAT).
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criminal convictions represent the majority of CAT claims today because of
combined legislative and regulatory efforts to expand the meaning of
“particularly serious crime.”200 Due to the way removal proceedings are
currently structured, an IJ must decide whether a crime is particularly serious
before considering whether an applicant is eligible for relief.201 Consequently,
by the time the IJ—occupying the roles of both judge and jury202—gets to the
merits of the case, the factfinder is not only aware of the prior conviction, but
has already concluded that the applicant is “a danger to the community of the
United States.”203
This is problematic for two reasons. First, an IJ who has made such a
determination is more likely to view a prior conviction as “indicating the
[applicant’s] willingness to violate the law, and thus suggesting a willingness to
violate the laws of perjury.”204 Second, making such a determination may
unfairly alter the IJ’s perception of the merits of the applicant’s case.205 Rather
than properly viewing the applicant in his capacity as a potential victim, an IJ
who sees the applicant as “a danger to the community of the United States” could
foreseeably view the applicant in his capacity as an established perpetrator.206
This shift in perspective is impermissible—removal, after all, is assumed to be
“nonpunitive in purpose and effect.”207
4. Law Displaced by Lottery
Other seemingly arbitrary factors can significantly affect the probability of
an erroneous denial. For many applicants seeking relief before a court official,
200
See Mary Holper, Redefining “Particularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law 13–22 (B.C. L. Sch. Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 381, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2667865 (detailing the expansion of
“particularly serious crime” from initially including only violent offenses to encompassing non-violent offenses
such as drug trafficking, possession of child pornography, and financial crimes).
201
See, e.g., Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that the IJ “first concluded that
Fuller’s conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault . . . was a ‘particularly serious crime’ that barred him
from withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT” (first citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012); then
citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (2016))).
202
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses. The immigration judge may issue
subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence.”).
203
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2).
204
Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 564, 574–75, 577 (2014).
205
Id.
206
Cf. id. at 578 (arguing that, in the context of impeachment by prior conviction in criminal trials, “it is
unrealistic to hope that the [limiting] instructions could serve to prevent jurors from using this evidence in
forbidden ways, such as viewing it as a sign of a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, or as a sign that a
defendant is better off locked up”).
207
Zadvyas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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“the result may be determined as much or more by who that official is, or where
the court is located, as it is by the facts and law of the case.”208 Although reported
statistics for CAT applications are unavailable, statistics for asylum proceedings
are instructive in this context—if only for the sake of establishing the premise
that, in cases in which “administrative decisions can mean the difference
between freedom and oppression and, quite possibly, life and death,”209
consistency is demonstrably absent.210
For example, in 2015, 48% of asylum applications were denied at the
national level; but in Atlanta, asylum relief was granted in only 2% of cases.211
Asylum seekers in New York, on the other hand, were successful 84% of the
time.212 Wide variations also exist among the judges at each location; for FYs
2011 through 2016, one New York City IJ recorded a 59% asylum denial rate,
while another denied relief to only 2.2% of applicants.213 An applicant’s chance
of success could also depend on the presiding IJ’s sex,214 work background,215
whether the applicant has access to legal representation,216 and whether the
applicant has any dependents.217 The circuit courts are not immune to this
208
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Adjudication and Proposals for Reform, 60
STAN. L. REV. 299, 302 (2007); see also Asylum Outcome Increasingly Depends on Judge Assigned,
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE: IMMIG., http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/447/ (last
visited Feb. 9, 2017).
209
Rodriguez-Roman v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 98 F.3d 416, 432–33 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
210
See generally Edward R. Grant, Law of Intended Consequences: IIRIRA and Other Unsung
Contributors to the Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 959 (2006) (noting the
inconsistent trends among appellate review of asylum petitions). Asylum statistics are also instructive here
because most asylum petitions considered at the appellate level are concerned with adverse credibility
determinations. Id. Credibility determinations in asylum cases are governed by the same standard as in all other
immigration proceedings, including CAT cases. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (2012).
211
FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 55, at K2. The inconsistency exists even if the applicant’s
nationality is controlled for. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 208, at 329 (“[A] Chinese asylum seeker
unlucky enough to have her case heard before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of success on her
asylum claim, as compared to 47% nationwide.”).
212
FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 55, at K2.
213
Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts: FY 2011–2016, TRANSACTIONAL RECS.
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE: IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/447/include/denialrates.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2017); see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 208, at 332–39 (describing disparities between
immigration judges within immigration courts).
214
See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 208, at 342 (“Female immigration judges granted asylum at a rate
of 53.8%, while male judges granted asylum at a rate of 37.3%. An asylum applicant assigned by chance to a
female judge therefore had a 44% better chance of prevailing than an applicant assigned to a male judge.”).
215
Id. at 344–46.
216
See id. at 340 (“Represented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times
as high as the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel.”).
217
See id. at 341 (“[W]hile asylum seekers with no dependents have a 42.3% grant rate, having one
dependent increases the grant rate to 48.2%.”).
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disparity either—an asylum applicant living in the Seventh Circuit has an 1800%
greater chance of winning her petition than someone in the Fourth Circuit.218
In sum, the risk of an erroneous deprivation in CAT proceedings is
significant. Numerous factors can, independently or in concert, threaten to
undermine the basic requirement that “the immigration laws of the United
States . . . be enforced vigorously and uniformly.”219 This section identifies five
such factors: (1) complications resulting from PTSD; (2) difficulties posed by
identity issues; (3) implicit judicial biases arising from vague legal standards,
time constraints, emotional exhaustion, and cultural differences; (4) additional
judicial biases resulting from particular aspects of CAT deferral proceedings;
and (5) seemingly arbitrary factors such as court location and judge assignment.
The need to address this high risk of error is further supported by the
government’s heightened interest in ensuring the accurate adjudication of CAT
proceedings.
D. The Government’s Interest
Generally speaking, the plenary power doctrine assigns disproportionate
weight to the government’s interest in avoiding “the possible burdens of
alternative procedures.”220 Even when its due process exception applies, the
doctrine nonetheless bars courts from reviewing substantive constitutional
challenges and generally demands judicial deference at a higher level than is
required elsewhere.221 But while the political branches’ powers over
immigration are drawn from international law, courts nonetheless “must
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today.”222 Thus, while the United States does not
officially recognize the jus cogens nature of non-refoulement in general,223 the
current state of international law clearly limits the previously unqualified right

218

Id. at 363.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 115(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3384.
220
Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–
35 (1976)); see supra notes 78–97 and accompanying text (describing the plenary power doctrine’s grant of
disproportionate power to the political branches).
221
See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“Judicial deference in the immigration context is of
special importance . . . .”); supra notes 97–120 and accompanying text (examining the due process exception to
the plenary power doctrine and its limited reach).
222
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
223
U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Observations on UNCHR Advisory Opinion on Extraterritorial Application
of Non-refoulement Obligations, STATE.GOV (Dec. 28, 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/2007/112631.
htm.
219
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of expulsion that each state enjoyed in centuries past.224 The Legislative and the
Executive Branches maintain the right to enact statutes contrary to the United
States’ international obligations,225 but in the context of the CAT, the exact
opposite is true.
The political branches’ unequivocal decision to be bound by the CAT’s
unqualified refoulement prohibition distinguishes the government’s interest in
proceedings involving the CAT from others. For example, in an asylum or
withholding of removal case where one of the statutory bars to relief applies,226
the United States can, ostensibly, comply with its obligations under the Refugee
Convention227 even if the applicant faces an indisputably high likelihood of
persecution upon return.228 Not so in CAT applications: relief improperly denied
runs afoul, not only of the individual’s constitutional and human rights, but of
the government’s international and domestic obligations.229 By writing the CAT
into law, Congress and the President turned the plenary power doctrine on its
head—unchecked authority is always free to check itself.
This notion is far from novel. In fact, it is rooted in the plenary power
doctrine’s jurisprudential foundation: The Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case
held that “[a]ll exceptions . . . to the full and complete power of a nation within
its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.”230
Therefore, when it comes to preventing refoulement under the CAT, the plenary
power doctrine serves to elevate the government’s interest, not in maintaining
status quo, but in ensuring the United States’ continued (or, some would argue,
renewed) fulfillment of its international obligations.

224
See Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 533, 533 (2001);
Mark R. von Sternberg, The Evolving Law of Non-refoulement and Its Influence on the Convention Refugee
Definition, 24 IN DEF. OF THE ALIEN 205, 205 (2001); David Delgado, Note, Running Afoul of the Nonrefoulement Principle: The [Mis]interpretation and [Mis]application of the Particularly Serious Crime
Exception, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 7 (2013).
225
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)).
226
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2012).
227
By ratifying the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the United States accepted an obligation
to comply with the substantive provisions of the Refugee Convention. See generally Refugee Convention, supra
note 24. In an effort to align U.S. law with these obligations, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). See also H.R. REP. NO. 96608, at 17–18 (1979) (describing efforts to satisfy the United States’ obligations to refugees).
228
See Refugee Convention, supra note 24, at art. 33(2) (providing national security and community safety
exceptions to the rule against refoulement).
229
See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (describing the CAT’s unique status in immigration law
as the only absolute bar to removal).
230
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (quoting
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)).
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Despite the elevated public interest in ensuring the faithful application of the
law in a manner reflecting the United States’ international commitments, other
governmental interests weigh against implementing substantial additional
safeguards. At the broadest level, the government has a practical interest “in
conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources.”231 This interest carries
substantial weight when it comes to today’s immigration courts, where IJs are
already bogged down with “Sisyphean caseload[s].”232 While it might be “easy
for us to say, ‘Let them hire more IJs,’” the probability of the government
deciding to “ramp up the budget for helping undocumented [and criminal] aliens
gain a legal foothold in the United States” in today’s political climate is virtually
nil.233 The government also has an interest in limiting systematic abuses,
including the use of loopholes to “take advantage of the system by
‘manufacturing’ a new case”234 and the general trend of fraud that plagues
immigration courts.235 CAT removal cases also often implicate the
government’s legitimate interests in preserving national security236 and in
“safeguarding the public from criminal aliens”237—inherent in every application
for deferral of removal is the issue of whether to permit the continued residence
of a person who has been classified, for one reason or another, as dangerous.238
Considered together, these factors dictate that any additional safeguards
imposed should disrupt the current procedural framework to the most limited
extent possible.

231

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 906 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); see also FY 2015
YEARBOOK, supra note 55, at W2 (noting that, as of September 30, 2015, immigration courts reported a backlog
of 457,106 pending cases).
233
Oshodi, 729 F.3d at 907 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting); see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg.
8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017) (prioritizing removal of aliens who “[h]ave been convicted of any criminal offense” and
who have entered without inspection, and providing for the hiring of “10,000 additional immigration officers”
but neglecting to provide for the hiring of any additional IJs).
234
Chun Wang Lin v. Holder, 402 F. App’x 604, 606 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538
F.3d 143, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2008)).
235
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-50, ASYLUM: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ASSESS AND ADDRESS FRAUD RISKS (2015).
236
See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995).
237
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
238
See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text (commenting on the prior criminal conviction
underlying every application for deferral of removal under the CAT).
232
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IV. A DEFERENTIAL COMPROMISE
Given the tremendous individual interests at stake,239 the elevated risk
having those interests erroneously deprived,240 and the government’s
substantial—albeit unencumbered by the plenary power doctrine—interest in
maintaining current procedures,241 further procedural protections for applicants
seeking deferral of removal under the CAT are worth considering. While any
number of ideal solutions exist (e.g., de novo circuit court review of credibility
determinations, requirement of government-appointed counsel, etc.), “the
probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”242 must
complement the government’s competing interests. For circuit courts
considering denied applications for CAT relief, the best solution focuses on
ensuring petitioners’ procedural due process rights within the narrow scope of
cases hinging exclusively on adverse credibility determinations.
While credibility is an important element in every CAT case, not all CAT
cases turn on credibility in an absolute way. Oftentimes, relief can be denied
justifiably regardless of the applicant’s credibility. For example, many
applicants, even if found credible, might legitimately fail to demonstrate that
future suffering is likely to occur,243 and many others who can show the
likelihood of future suffering might nonetheless be unable to show that it will
amount to torture.244 In contrast, the focus here is on what happens when an
applicant’s claims regarding matters of personal experience and identity are
determinative: if his testimony is found credible, relief is granted; if not, relief
is denied. Of course, even in cases turning solely on credibility, the possibility
remains that the IJ’s determination could very well be reasonable.245 But in cases
like Fuller, in which an IJ’s flawed assessment implies an underlying lack of

239

See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178–218 and accompanying text.
241
See supra notes 220–38 and accompanying text.
242
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
243
See, e.g., Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with the BIA’s reversal of
the IJ’s grant of CAT relief when evidence indicated that Marshall Islands law criminalizing homosexuality
existed, but was not enforced); Awuku v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 331 F. App’x 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying
petition for review when the record established only the “possibility,” rather than a greater-than-not likelihood,
that the alien would be subjected to torture); Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2006)
(denying petition for review when the petitioner’s past experiences were too “disparate in time, place, nature
and severity” to demonstrate a future likelihood of torture).
244
See, e.g., Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying petition for review
when an alien failed to show that the Guatemalan government acquiesced in the torture he was likely to
experience at the hands of gang members upon return).
245
See, e.g., Nasriev v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 571 F. App’x 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2014) (listing eight specific and
logical reasons cited by the IJ in support of adverse credibility determination).
240
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impartiality, judicial passivity can perpetuate injustice. In these situations,
circuit courts, although indisputably bound by deferential statutory and
precedential standards of review,246 should nonetheless apply a more contextual
due process analysis.
The circuits are split regarding the applicable standard for establishing a due
process violation resulting from prejudice. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits all subscribe to a “substantial prejudice” standard.247 In the Third and
Fifth Circuits, a petitioner alleging substantial prejudice must show that he or
she would otherwise be eligible for relief.248 For applicants in the Sixth Circuit,
establishing substantial prejudice requires a showing that “the proceeding was
so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting
his case.”249 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit determines substantial prejudice
based on whether the petitioner can “show the alleged due process violation
would have affected the outcome of the case.”250 The First Circuit, on the other
hand, requires only a showing of prejudice,251 but otherwise adopts the same
standard as the Eleventh Circuit.252 Diverging from its sister circuits, the Ninth
Circuit holds that applicants “need only demonstrate ‘that the outcome of the
proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.’”253
The Ninth Circuit’s standard is best. Had it been applied in Fuller, the IJ’s
assertion that Fuller’s sexual relationships with women disproved his bisexuality
may have prompted a different result.254 Certainly, the mistake may have been
an innocent one. But it is equally likely that the IJ, perhaps overburdened by an
246
See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (describing the deferential standard of review that circuit
courts are bound by).
247
Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2011); Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 979 (6th
Cir. 2009); Avila v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 560 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009); De Zavala v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d
879, 883 (5th Cir. 2004).
248
See Denis, 633 F.3d at 219 (“Mindful of our focus on substantial prejudice, we reasoned that where an
alien ‘cannot demonstrate that he was eligible for relief . . . under the CAT, no procedural due process claim can
lie.’” (quoting De Zavala, 386 F.3d at 883)); Anwar v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 116 F.3d 140, 144
(5th Cir. 1997) (“In order for Anwar to show . . . substantial prejudice, . . . [he] must make a prima facie showing
that he was eligible for asylum and that he could have made a strong showing in support of his application.”).
249
Lin, 565 F.3d at 979 (quoting Hassan v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
250
Avila, 560 F.3d at 1285 (11th Cir. 2009).
251
Zhou Zheng v. Holder, 570 F.3d 438, 442 (1st Cir. 2009).
252
Compare id. (“[P]rejudice equates with a showing that ‘an abridgement of due process is likely to have
affected the outcome of the proceedings.’” (quoting Pulisir v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 302, 311 (1st Cir. 2008))),
with Avila, 560 F.3d at 1285 (requiring the petitioner to “show the alleged due process violation would have
affected the outcome of the case”).
253
Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073,
1076 (9th Cir. 2005)).
254
See Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2016).
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ever-increasing caseload and unduly influenced by surrounding circumstances,
let bias slip through the cracks.255 In either instance, the IJ’s actions “may
have . . . affected” the outcome of the case.”256 As a result, the matter would
have been remanded, along with instructions that would “strongly encourage the
BIA to assign [the] case to a different judge on remand in order to avoid any
perception of lingering bias.”257 On remand, Fuller might still have been denied
relief, but he would not have been denied due process.
Under the “may have been” standard, reviewing courts are better equipped
to protect CAT applicants’ substantial liberty interests by preventing
miscarriages of justice that would otherwise be unreviewable. Further, this less
restrictive approach is unlikely to prove unduly burdensome for the
government—reviewable dispositions of CAT claims amounted to only 4% of
completed matters in immigration courts in 2015,258 and its limited scope is
likely to only apply to a small portion of that percentage.259 This solution also
fits squarely within the plenary power doctrine’s well-established procedural
due process exception and, far from treading upon the political judgment of
Congress and the Executive Branch, furthers the federal government’s
statutorily enshrined policies by ensuring the proper disposition of applications
for CAT-based relief.260
CONCLUSION
Foreign nationals living in the United States today face one of the most
overtly xenophobic administrations in modern American history. For those at
risk of being tortured upon returning to their home countries, the President’s
apparent coziness with implementing state-sponsored torture provides yet
another reason for concern.261 Applying a more exacting standard of due process
255

See supra notes 178–207 (discussing the factors affecting bias in CAT proceedings).
Oshodi, 729 F.3d at 896 (quoting Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005))
(emphasis omitted).
257
Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005).
258
See FY 2015 YEARBOOK, supra note 55, at A2, M1 (10,483 denied or approved CAT claims out of
262,293 completed immigration matters).
259
It is important to clarify that this solution’s scope is limited to cases, such as Fuller, that turn on adverse
credibility determinations. Other complicating factors, such as the government’s definition of torture, have been
addressed elsewhere. See sources cited supra note 56.
260
See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2136 (2015); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009).
261
E.g., Damian Paletta, Donald Trump Says He Believes Torture, Waterboarding “Work,” but Will Defer
to Defense Chief, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2017, 2:00 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-says-hebelieves-torture-and-waterboarding-work-but-will-defer-to-defense-chief-1485543609; Charlie Savage, Trump
Poised to Lift Ban on C.I.A. “Black Site” Prisons, N.Y. TIMES: POLITICS, (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/cia-detainee-prisons.html?_r=0.
256
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review in CAT cases hinging on credibility will not drastically alter the legal
landscape, nor is it intended to. The goal here is not to drastically increase the
number of successful applications for relief, but ensure that when relief is
denied, it is denied correctly. To borrow from Justice Jackson, “Procedural
fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty.”262 When
decision makers are overburdened, applicants are disadvantaged, and outcomes
are defined in terms of relative safety and possible torture, additional due process
guarantees—however slight—are not only justified, but necessary.
D. BRUCE JANZEN, JR.∗
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Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Emory University School of Law, J.D., 2018; Candler School of Theology, Emory University, M.Div.,
2018. I would like to thank Professors Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Silas Allard at the Center for the Study
of Law and Religion for their constant support and encouragement throughout the writing process, as well as the
editorial staff and executive board, specially Matthew Demartini, Lucy Gauthier, and Janiel Myers of the Emory
Law Journal for spending their graduation week editing this Comment and also for the countless hours of editing
and re-editing that made this Comment possible.
∗

